12. Červenec 2020
We study learning algorithms that optimize revenue in repeated contextual posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that seeks to maximize his cumulative discounted surplus. The buyer's valuation of a good is a fixed private function of a d-dimensional context (feature) vector that describes the good being sold. In contrast to existing studies on repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyer, in our work, the seller is not assumed to know the parametric model that underlies this valuation function. We introduce a novel non-parametric learning algorithm that is horizon-independent and has tight strategic regret upper bound of Θ(T^d/(d+1)). We also non-trivially generalize several value-localization techniques of non-contextual repeated auctions to make them effective in the considered contextual non-parametric learning of the buyer valuation function.
The International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML) is the premier gathering of professionals dedicated to the advancement of the branch of artificial intelligence known as machine learning. ICML is globally renowned for presenting and publishing cutting-edge research on all aspects of machine learning used in closely related areas like artificial intelligence, statistics and data science, as well as important application areas such as machine vision, computational biology, speech recognition, and robotics. ICML is one of the fastest growing artificial intelligence conferences in the world. Participants at ICML span a wide range of backgrounds, from academic and industrial researchers, to entrepreneurs and engineers, to graduate students and postdocs.
Pro uložení prezentace do věčného trezoru hlasovalo 0 diváků, což je 0.0 %
Prezentace na podobné téma, kategorii nebo přednášejícího